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Abstract 
 
 
The conceptual model which underpins recent developments in Indigenous living 
conditions policy defines a need to increase client commitment to its objectives.  This 
study provides an economic examination of similar historical expectations which have 
been placed on Indigenous social housing clients.  It considers Indigenous poverty in 
an historical context and examines the rationality of increasing the obligations of 
Indigenous clients who are existing in marginal communities.  In light of economic 
arguments the analysis defines some minimum requirements of social policy models 
and it recommends that any ‘mutual obligation’ policy model rationally consider the 
needs of its client population.  The discussion concludes that autocratic problem 
definitions and their imposed solutions are unlikely to recruit the support of clients. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Over recent years concern about persistently unhealthy living conditions and the 
pathological consequences of welfare dependency has prompted the Commonwealth 
Government to apply its obligation-based policy model to Indigenous assistance 
programs (The Australian 2004:1; CM 2004:1; CM 2004b:1; Rowse 2005:1).  This 
‘mutual-obligation’ approach emphasises personal responsibility over previously 
entrenched ‘civil liberties’ and, as such, it appears to break with long-standing 
Indigenous social policy tradition (Rowse 2002:263; CM 2004b:1).  
 
The following discussion is a reasoned examination of Indigenous mutual-obligation 
policy in comparison with the philosophical expectations of concepts such as 
obligation.  It asks whether this obligation-based policy approach can logically expect 
increased client commitment to policy objectives.  To articulate this logic, the analysis 
observes certain moments in the history of Indigenous living conditions.  The evidently 
flawed policy at these historical moments is compared with both the sense of 
contemporary Indigenous mutual obligation policy and historical policy objectives.  In 
light of historical experience the discussion examines the logical basis for assuming 
that contemporary clients can embrace the perceived obligations upon which the 
outcomes of existing policy depend. 
 
Prior to highlighting conceptual flaws in Commonwealth mutual obligation (MO) policy, 
its theoretical underpinning must be delimited.  For the purposes of this discussion, MO 
is derived in general from modern-liberal moral ideals about individual responsibility 
and a perceived reciprocity that ought to be associated with public welfare assistance 
(Goodin 2002:579-81).  In this view, social policy is extraordinary compassionate 
assistance which imposes on mainstream liberty and thereby carries a moral obligation 
for which ‘welfare’ clients must reciprocate on demand (see Goodin 2002:579-81).  
This obligation is minimally an expectation that those who are assisted act to embrace 
self-reliant individualism as required by government.  Such expectations normally 
require citizen integration into full-time work, or attempts in this aim.  Government MO 
policy generally requires Indigenous people to expend more energy solving prescribed 
problems in housing, health and other living conditions as defined within shared 
responsibility agreements (SRAs) (see Pearson 2000:87; Rowse 2002:263,271).  For 
the purposes of this discussion, SRAs can be seen as a strategy which focuses 
Indigenous and government efforts on economic and environmental objectives which 
the government assistance programs present as fundamental.   
 
Thus contemporary MO policy could parallel historical attempts to recruit Indigenous 
participation in solving perceived living conditions problems and achieving economic 
independence.  The initial discussion will set the scene for an historical comparison by 
first representing Indigenous economic self-reliance and unproblematic living 
conditions.  The analysis will highlight some relevant historical judgements about 
individual independence and the construction of moral obligations through welfare 
policy.  A historical case study will then be examined to further exemplify the difficulties 
in pragmatically imposing moral obligations.  Its contemporary significance is evident in 
the (philosophical) second half of the paper after historic arguments judge how policy 
fails when it thwarts the established economic strategies of individuals. 
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Indigenous Economic Self-Reliance: Problematic or Unproblematic Conditions: 
 
 
It has been argued that, prior to European colonization, Indigenous ‘economic culture’ 
was ‘determined by hunting and foraging production systems’ with women and children 
providing both the ‘surplus production and surplus labour’, that ensured a satisfying 
quality of life (Briscoe 1989:200).  Traditional social interaction facilitated considerable 
personal amenity (Memmott 1988; Berndt & Berndt 1992; Thompson 2004).  An 
unproblematic traditional life-style allows individuals cultural freedom to satisfy basic, 
social and artistic needs (See Zastrow & Kirst-Ashman 2004:389-91; Locke 1992).  Put 
simply, culture defined Indigenous normality, including perceived freedoms, community 
organization and pathology.  Within economically defined limits, traditional self-
determination permitted Indigenous choice and access to needed goods and services.  
Such problems as existed were self-determined and were addressed economically in 
accord with Indigenous culture. 
 
This approach is compatible with the modern-liberal view that individuals benefit from 
being self-reliant.  Specifically, self-reliance is facilitated by liberty but is thwarted by 
constraints to individual economic behaviour, including imposed economic-welfare 
outcomes.  Public intervention into contemporary Indigenous living conditions can be 
contrasted with traditional Indigenous independence, and can be compared with 
historic welfare intervention.  If however, these interventions into Indigenous living 
conditions were strategic responses to imposed dependence (Thompson 2004), then 
they were irrational and inconsistent with any sense of moral obligation. 
 
 
Constructing Obligation through Welfare  
 
 
The following discussion explores the rationality of historic policy and uses its logic to 
help define contemporary policy.  It compares historical and contemporary assumptions 
about client obligations and then critiques both the moral and rational justifications for 
such obligations after policy intervention. 
 
In the 1960s, the beginning of the current humanitarian approach to Indigenous policy 
(Thompson 2004; Hughes 1995), Australian governments ‘settled’ and thereby 
concentrated remote Indigenous people beyond the economic (foraging) capacity of 
their local environments (Memmott 1991; Thompson 2004).  Government had assumed 
economic integration was a ‘needed’ response to poverty and developed ‘special 
measures’ to respond.  They were ‘regarded as temporary measures, not based on 
race, but intended to meet’ a perceived ‘need for special care and assistance’ 
(Australia 1965:v).  Indigenous people were expected to ‘make the transition from one 
stage to another in such a way as w[as] favourable to their social, economical and 
political advancement’ (Australia 1965:v).  At this time Indigenous policy destroyed 
Indigenous self-determination by imposing ‘needed’ solutions on a population which 
was being made dependent through settlement and concentration policy.  This social 
policy was, and is, viewed in the public arena as a compassionate response to 
Indigenous housing and other ‘needs’.  
 
Prior to 1963 ‘very few Aborigines … possessed houses’ or ‘the normal services which 
one would find in a European home’ but by 1965 social concern constructed an 
Indigenous welfare problem requiring ‘about a hundred houses equipped with stoves, 
water …, toilets etc’ (Australia 1965:75).  Indigenous living conditions became 
problematic after European settlement (Rowley 1967:797; Briscoe 1989; Memmott 
1991:64-77; Shaw 1993:24; Thompson 2004) though, from one Indigenous 
perspective, pastoral capitalism changed the economic role of Indigenous women, 
undermined traditional surplus production and then promoted State regulation of 
 4
Indigenous economic needs (Briscoe 1989:200-1). Compassionate intentions focussed 
on Indigenous need but acted to impose ‘staged’ cultural change on a socially and 
economically different population (Heppell 1979:8-10; Memmott 1988:34; Sanders 
1990:39; Hughes 1995:369-71).  Socio-economic ‘primitiveness’ was the principal 
focus for compassionate intervention and the welfare conference of 1965 lauded the 
small number of houses constructed to gradually advance Indigenous living conditions 
(Australia 1965:75).   From one economic perspective, social policy modified a 
previously different but unproblematic life-style, even though the mainstream economic 
system seemed regionally incapable of compensating the economic damage done 
(See Memmott, 1991:64-77; Thompson 2004).   
 
In the 1960s compassionate concerns construed Indigenous life-styles as ‘poverty’, 
especially after traditional foraging, hunting, gathering and construction processes 
were proscribed by settlement practices.  As a consequence, individual independence 
was constrained as individuals increasingly perceived that they were not free to use 
their culturally and legally sanctioned economic need-satisfaction processes.  Though 
the 1965 Aboriginal Welfare Conference sought to compassionately ‘improve the status 
of the Aborigines by removing restrictions upon them, extending voting rights to them, 
and expanding social measures for their welfare” (Australia 1965:iv), the intervention 
constrained individual economic independence and was hardly obliging (Thompson 
2004).  Though modern liberalism accepts some restraint of individual freedoms when 
ensuring the functioning of the capitalist market, it does not advocate that (Indigenous) 
economic behaviour be proscribed or replaced by welfare based economic behaviour. 
Indigenous ‘settlement’ and welfare intervention ‘particularly in the fields of education, 
housing and health’ (Australia 1965:iv), was designed to comprehensively ‘advance’ 
the behaviour of Indigenous clients and therefore it comprehensively imposed on 
individual freedom and modern-liberal principles.   
 
If historic policy is to be compared with the expected commitment of MO policy, then 
the likelihood of Indigenous commitment to ‘advancement’ should be considered at 
both normative and pragmatic levels. Normatively, the level to which Indigenous people 
should have been obliged (thankful) for this compassionate intervention is based on 
the perceived level of compensation (satisfaction increments) it achieved over 
previously imposed disbenefits.  At a pragmatic level, for Indigenous clients to commit 
to this policy mix, they must be economically capable of it.  This economic capability is 
determined by how much added satisfaction they receive for the effort expended in 
achieving the desired advancement.  Thus, commitment to this outcome is based on its 
being perceived superior to the benefits from deploying energy in seeking ‘primitive’ 
satisfactions.  By contrast, with impersonal mainstream perceptions that Indigenous 
welfare is ‘compassionate’ and satisfying, Indigenous perceptions of the policy are 
economically derived and only result from real experiences and subjective judgements 
about comparative satisfaction. 
 
Memmott’s (1988) work is enlightening about the actual satisfaction which was 
achieved from earlier policy assistance.  He argues that Indigenous social housing of 
the 1960s was likely to be less comfortable than vernacular dwellings (‘humpies’) and 
in some cases was near uninhabitable1.  If, as evidence indicates, the key objective of 
policy-makers was socio-economic ‘advancement’ rather than Indigenous satisfaction, 
then it is economically irrational to assume Indigenous enjoyment of this social 
assistance or even obligation perceived from the agenda.  Simply, this compassionate 
policy focussed on imposing change on deficient ‘primitiveness’2 rather than on 
                                                          
 1   
This housing Saini described as sub-standard (1967:792). 
 2The Welfare Conferences of Commonwealth and State Authorities of 1963, 1965 and 1967 seemed 
strategically focussed on a Eurocentric vision of Indigenous ‘progress' rather than on Indigenous quality of life 
(Thompson 2004:124). 
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increasing actual Indigenous satisfaction in compensation for imposed poverty 
(Thompson 2004:124).   
 
On normative and pragmatic grounds, Indigenous clients ought not to feel obliged for 
this intervention, yet the immediately following case-discussion portrays 
misconceptions about reciprocal obligations attached to the deployed welfare model. 
 
 
A Historical Case-Study of Pragmatic Policy Approaches to Obligation  
 
 
An early file note in the Northern Territory Administration’s ‘Aboriginal Housing on 
Settlements and Missions — Rental Policy’ file presents the contemporaneous welfare 
housing policy as an enlightening case of economic mechanics, implicit coercion and 
flawed assumptions about social-obligations.  This file exposes socio-economic 
integration as the dominant objective of social-housing policy.  It also presents rent-
payment and cash management as ‘needs’ of Indigenous people (see Thompson 
2004).  The aim of this case-study is to provide parallels with contemporary policy by 
exposing the continuity in underlying beliefs about client obligations. It all the more 
enlightening that these ideas about obligations were part of an intervention which 
facilitated Indigenous dependency.  
 
The heading ‘Cash Payment of Rentals’, denotes an early, obligation-based argument 
within Welfare Services, NT Administration.  In it a bureaucrat argued for cash payment 
of rent rather than direct deduction from wages, because: 
 
The whole idea appears pointless unless aboriginals actually pay the rent in 
cash.  If they have it deducted from their wages ... then they would continue to 
receive the same net wage as before and the whole idea of educating the 
persons concerned in their social obligation will be lost (Acting Finance Officer 
1965:14). 
 
The assumption underpinning this 1965 quote is that, in gratitude for welfare housing, 
intervention Indigenous people have a social obligation.  This obligation is not obvious 
to them because they do not yet understand the economic system into which they 
ought to assimilate.  Though proper behaviour is manifest in a housed life-style and 
regular payment of rent, these clients have not at this time been morally trained to 
understand these issues.   
 
In the view of the NT Administration’s Acting Finance Officer: 
 
Aborigines should be required to pay cash.  …  The whole purpose of the 
exercise for Aborigines is to train them in the ways of our civilisation and unless 
cash payment is a part of the exercise, I consider that almost the entire 
potential value of this exercise will be lost (1965:5). 
 
Clearly, the value of cash is a readily evident and imprintable measure of obligation.  
Welfare housing therefore incorporates a training program for encouraging Indigenous 
people to accept mainstream social and economic obligations (Thompson 2004).  In 
providing social housing, health and education, the Commonwealth had previously 
stated that: 
 
all persons of Aboriginal descent will choose to attain a similar manner and 
standard of living to that of other Australians and live as members of a single 
Australian community – enjoying the same rights and privileges, accepting the 
same responsibilities and influenced by the same hopes and loyalties as other 
Australians (Australia 1965:v).  
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This definitive statement of intent shows how Indigenous people who accepted the 
rights and privileges of civil society must also accept the obligations associated with it.  
This logic holds that individuals must accept an assigned economic value for welfare 
assistance (including provided housing) and acknowledge the expected obligation for 
that value.  Illogically they must judge the value of this assistance higher than their own 
‘primitive’ values.  The rent training experience is part of an Indigenous assimilation 
agenda which requires that prescribed values be internalised for both housing and the 
social obligations associated with accepting housing assistance.  
 
It seems that, from its inception, an implied system of mutual obligation underpinned 
Indigenous social policy.  This system expected bilateral reciprocal actions but 
contained paradoxical problems in respect of values and the pragmatics of Indigenous 
obligations.  
 
A firm policy of eviction for arrears will need to be followed in conjunction with a 
waiting list system for priority in allocation of housing.  It will be necessary that 
this type of housing be attractive to the Aborigines so that there will be … an 
incentive for those already in houses to pay their rent so that they will not be 
displaced by those on the waiting list and revert again to the lower standard of 
accommodation.  Just how this housing is made attractive to the Aborigines will 
be a matter for the welfare Branch to determine by (sic) psychological grounds 
and … in the building and equipping of the house (Acting Finance Officer 
1965:5). 
 
Though the overt purpose of the welfare program was to meet Indigenous housing 
needs, the socio-economic integration agenda sought to impose acceptable values on 
Indigenous people.  Yet logical problems undermined this modern-liberal obligation 
system.  First, as implied by the NT Administration’s Acting Finance Officer, Aborigines 
did not perceive the intervention (housing) as sufficiently satisfying or needed to 
warrant obligations.  Second, as they had been coerced to live in these houses, rather 
than having chosen to live in them, they did not need them and could not economically 
allocate scarce resources to them (Thompson 2004).  Scarce resources can only be 
rationally allocated to needed (desirable) goods.  
 
In support of this conclusion, it is evident within the logic of the Acting Finance Officer 
that the economic value assigned to the ‘needed’ housing was arbitrary and required 
‘psychological’ intervention to encourage its acceptance.  His thinking highlights the 
difficulties in embedding obligations through psychological coercion. 
 
It is considered that under no circumstances should this venture be confused 
with commercial debt recovery [and]… court actions … will not be applicable[, 
as]... rents not collected will be recorded as expenditure in the education of 
aborigines rather than as unrecovered debts (1965:5). 
 
This exercise in ‘educating the persons concerned in their social obligation’ (Jones 
1965:5) required a housing training program which so encouraged clients to live in, and 
value houses, that they felt obliged to pay for them.  The ‘purpose of the exercise’ was 
to promote ‘the ways of our civilisation’ through ‘cash payment’ of rent.  Thus 
government wished to create a sense of obligation which increased with client 
satisfaction, but the officer worried that the obligation would reduce should they 
experience harsh punishment for not paying.  Clearly, punitive regimes were counter 
productive since they were likely to frighten potential clients rather than imprint existing 
clients with a psychological commitment to economic obligation.  
 
The problem in the economic logic of the housing intervention program was that, if 
Indigenous people did not feel the ‘need’ for the housing that they had been informed 
they needed, and chose not to pay for it, eviction was counterproductive to the housing 
training program and of little possible consequence to the resident.  As the housing 
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program was a coercive approach to socio-economic integration, provided a poor level 
of satisfaction, and created financial obligations for which Aborigines were poorly 
equipped, there were few incentives and evident disincentives involved in housing 
consumption and rent-payment.  The Acting Finance Officer considered these 
economic disincentives when establishing this obligation.   
 
To apply too high a rental in the first instance ... may tend to discourage desirable 
tenants from upgrading their standard of living. .... There is therefore a case for the 
application of non-economic rental in order that the concept of rent be gradually 
appreciated (Acting Finance Officer 1965:5-6).  
 
He also foresaw problems which might be involved in strategic trickery which 
manipulated wages to compensate for these rent costs.                  
 
If wage increases equivalent to the rents payable are made, I feel sure that this 
will be to the detriment of the scheme.  The Aborigines themselves will regard it 
as a confidence trick and so will other people in the community and it will attract 
adverse publicity for the Administration (Acting Finance Officer 1965:5).  
 
Ironically it can also be argued that socio-economic integration is both needed by and 
is fundamental to a modern-liberal market society, and thus it is the mainstream that 
benefits from Indigenous integration policy.  Some sophisticated trickery was required 
to establish Indigenous obligations.   
 
The Acting Finance Officer recognized both the economic and comparative aspects of 
this dilemma: 
 
I consider that as these people are now citizens and are going to be offered 
European-type houses, they must be given sufficient money to live like 
Europeans and maintain their houses ...  Whether such additional rise in wages 
is restricted to those who are allocated the improved housing is a matter to be 
decided also.  Personally I think it could go hand in hand with the housing, and 
in reverse also if the tenant is evicted.   This will add to the incentive on the part 
of Aborigines to conform with our standards…  (Recent audit reports lead me to 
doubt whether the Social Welfare Branch possesses the establishment and 
staffing to successfully administer such a scheme at present.) (Acting Finance 
Officer 1965:5). 
 
The Acting Finance Officer is clearly emphasizing a government’s obligation to improve 
the economic situation of Indigenous people towards mainstream standards.  His 
argument is that, if Indigenous people are obliged to conform to ‘our standards’, they 
need to be given a decent quality of life.  As the Social Welfare Branch had insufficient 
resources, he doubted that the Government’s obligations could be met, yet he ignored 
logical conclusions about the existence of Indigenous obligations.   
 
Ironically the Government was abrogating its responsibilities to Indigenous clients, yet 
it was still paramount,  
 
to impress on the tenants concerned the idea that the privilege of home occupancy 
should be matched by acceptance of reciprocal responsibilities.  (Acting Finance Officer 
1965:5-6.)   
 
This specious conceptualization of reciprocal responsibilities emphasizes client 
obligations, ignores unmet Government obligations and assumes impositions are 
obliging if about ‘advancement’.   
 
The above case-study implies that the Indigenous welfare agenda has developed 
around misconceptions about reciprocal obligations.  Though the historical policy 
provided unsatisfactory compensation for imposed poverty, failed to facilitate 
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mainstream liberty (economic independence) and imposed upon traditional Indigenous 
liberty, it assumed that Indigenous needs were satisfied and therefore that Indigenous 
people should be obliged for unsolicited assistance.   As these needs were not their 
own, it must be concluded that there is neither a logical reason for Indigenous people 
to perceive any obligation toward this policy, nor a rational economic possibility that 
they could assume obligations for this policy.  The case study must be considered an 
example of the economic irrationality which can underpin the insertion of ‘obligation’ 
into Indigenous policy.  The discussion has parallels with contemporary irrationality in 
MO policy. 
 
 
Economic Reflections on MO Policy 
 
 
Modern liberal thought presumes both that rational individuals are able to decide if they 
are happy, and that they can choose those factors which they need to make 
themselves happy.  Coercion limits Indigenous liberty and thus the subjectively 
determined welfare which individuals can achieve through independent decision-
making. It is argued that the coercive policy evident above imposed on individual 
freedom excessively and beyond the normal limitations of modern-liberal interventions.  
Though liberal society limits some freedoms to assure essential determinants for a 
healthy market (ie safety, security, health), Indigenous welfare policy imposed heavily 
on individual behaviour and Aborigines’ capacity to achieve culturally-endorsed 
satisfactions.  At this time, policy presented as compassionate and (needs) satisfying.   
 
The economic logic which upholds the primacy of individual freedom also holds that 
individuals choose that which is needed/wanted in accord with: the economic 
resources available, the options available and the economic cost of each choice.  
Economic decision-making is based on logic, knowledge of costs and the perceived 
satisfaction possible from the different potential outcomes.  Thus, imposing high rental 
costs on housing which, for cultural reasons, provides little utility, can only starve poor 
clients of resources for satisfying their real needs.  Where there is a regionally limited 
market, little employment and widespread poverty, rent payments for imposed housing 
cannot be a priority and can only be established coercively.  This coerced expenditure 
regime limits Indigenous freedom and the capacity individuals have for independently 
achieving satisfaction and utility.  
 
The historical logic of reciprocal obligation is paradoxical as it conceptualises 
Indigenous housing ‘need’ both as an imperative to impose mainstream socio-
economic standards and a basis for compassionate assistance.  The compassionate 
aspect permits social obligations to be attached to this imposition. Yet, in contrast with 
both ‘market’ and ‘hunter-gatherer’ economics, prescribed obligations overshot the 
satisfaction which clients achieved in their mandatory settlements.  Satisfaction is 
normally determined by consumers when choosing how much of their economic 
resources they wish to expend on a good or service.  There was no choice within these 
economic interventions and Indigenous rental obligations were not institutionalised 
(see Thompson 2004).  
 
 
Logical Conflict within the Policy Model 
 
 
Historic policies sought to solve problems (of advancement) which were imposed on 
Indigenous people.  Though they failed to compensate for the economic oppression 
which settlement caused, intervention was constructed as compassionate and linked 
with obligations.  Further, the case study demonstrates how Indigenous financial 
resources were to be depleted by obligation-linked rental policy, though the logic of 
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these obligations was not considered.  The economic impact of rental policy reduces 
individuals’ capacity to meet their experienced, rather than imposed needs, and the 
rational impossibility of the long-term policy must result in its failure.    
 
Though the (above) language of this perceived compassionate welfare agenda 
emphasised liberal rights and responsibilities, the policy intervention imposed 
responsibilities over liberal rights.  This concept of responsibility accorded more with 
conservative values which forced conformity and socio-economic normality, rather than 
with liberal ideals of non-harmful self-determination and economic freedom.  It must be 
concluded that Indigenous people had no rational or moral reason to feel obligations 
for the formative welfare policies which were attached to the ‘compassionate’ 
intervention.  Moreover, there is no real mutual-obligation if clients do not perceive that 
they are justly assisted or if they cannot afford the cost of commitment to the policy.  
 
 
The Contemporary Significance of the Study  
 
 
Indigenous living-conditions policy is currently presented as compassionate but a 
practical failure that requires redevelopment incorporating fresh ideas such as mutual 
obligation (see Howard 1999; Pearson 1999; C.M. 2004b).  The history of reciprocal 
obligation based policy seems unconsidered in this policy revision and will be viewed 
against the generalities of MO policy below.   
 
Evidently the ideology of Indigenous ‘advancement’ and economic integration 
dominated past thinking with choice and self-determination ignored as central 
parameters of satisfaction and economic welfare.  In line with such historical 
perceptions, the new Commonwealth welfare agenda is also about increasing the 
controls (or obligations) that are associated with compassionate assistance (see 
Howard 1999).  ‘Tough Love’ based ‘Mutual obligation’ policy assumes that welfare 
clients should expend more of their own resources achieving the government’s 
objectives as laid down in SRAs.  Though independence is the overt goal of the policy, 
the direction is towards government and ‘community’ or ‘brokers’ defining the interests 
of the client (McClure 2000:14, 38,39; Rowse 2002:270).  The Government has the 
bargaining power in this situation, and there is a danger that clients are relatively 
powerless.     
 
Client powerlessness may not be the intended outcome of MO policy, but there is 
broad acceptance of government intervention into irresponsible behaviour among 
welfare clients. Contemporary Indigenous policy is being revised to ensure Indigenous 
individuals commit to prescribed obligations after receiving too many perceived rights 
(Howard 1999). Yet Hughes argued in 1995 that ‘self-determination’ policy already 
imposed intolerable controls upon Indigenous clients (Hughes 1995).  Hughes 
maintained that the coercive policy frameworks of the 1960s and 1970s persist.  Even 
in the 2000s expert knowledge determines the priorities of remote Indigenous people, 
their living conditions problems, and their needs, and it now imposes SRA-endorsed 
changes on their social living conditions (Thompson 2004).  In this context imposed 
obligations and client powerlessness seem a consistent trend since the 1960s case 
study and can be critiqued against the failures of that policy. 
 
 
Avoiding Imposed Dependence 
 
 
Modern-liberal logic about decision-making can be applied to the expectations of both 
the conservative historical policy and the contemporary MO policy.  Liberalism 
assumes for normal consumers that independent decision-making optimizes resource 
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allocation.  Yet the failure of the 1960s’ and 1970s’ rent collection program, which the 
Acting Finance Officer’s predicted, was perceived as a moral failure of Indigenous 
clients.  Irrespective of economic arguments about individuals not voluntarily expending 
resources on undesired goods, clients were perceived delinquent for their 
economically-logical non-participation (Thompson 2004).  Welfare experts were 
perceived capable, but failed to assess the ‘need’ for housing, its value to consumers 
and then the motivation required to impose associated obligations.  To avoid this type 
of logical paradox, contemporary MO policy must institutionalize client priorities, and 
realistic satisfactions. 
 
Yet the expectations of the new Indigenous policy approach advocated by Pearson 
(1999) and by Howard (C.M. 2004b:1) (see also Howard 1999) can be compared with a 
policy history of demonstrated failure, primarily because they both focus on coercive 
reciprocity.  The current Commonwealth Government welfare agenda seems 
unashamedly based on ‘conservative’ principles such as obligations and controls, even 
though its economic precepts recognize the need for individual autonomy (Howard 
1999).  Consistent with the historical failure of the ‘rent’ program and Hughes’ 
arguments about policy-paradox, Pearson and Howard see a solution to Indigenous 
welfare dependency not in reducing paternal controls but in increasing them.  Pearson 
wants Indigenous leaders to be given increased control over Indigenous clients (Rowse 
2002:271) and Howard wants to increase the general regulation that is imposed upon 
these clients (C.M. 2004b:1).  Policy observers are invited to consider welfare 
‘dependency’, as a problematic inability to achieve economic independence yet the 
policy reduces clients’ capacity to make independent economic decisions.  In resorting 
to increased control, policy replicates the historic conservatism of Indigenous welfare, 
an approach which conceptualizes the caring intention more than the reality of the 
assistance.  
 
Just as historic housing policy failed because policy-makers had little understanding of 
the culturally based needs and satisfactions of Indigenous lifestyles, contemporary 
policy must be considered against Indigenous economic reality.  In the case of 
Indigenous housing policy, if housing is conceptualized independent of real Indigenous 
needs, it will provide insufficient amenity for the economic cost attributed to it. The 
most basic premise of modern liberalism –as supported within Commonwealth 
Government policy -is that the active choice process occurs at the individual level and 
thereby ensures that amenity is optimized and cost is minimized.  It is thus illogical for 
Government to favor the decision-making of Indigenous representatives over individual 
preferences and culturally determined needs (see Thompson 2004).  
 
 If the needs, which are serviced by Government, are defined by experts or even 
Indigenous representatives, they cannot rationally satisfy or logically justify obligation 
at the individual level.   
 
Imposing housing ‘needs’ furthers conservative objectives such as Indigenous socio-
economic conformity (see Saini 1967:789), rather than compassionate objectives such 
as assistance.  This logic which explains both historic impositions and the lack of 
Indigenous commitment to mainstream perceptions of the ‘problem’ also highlights the 
dangers for current policy approaches which appear to compassionately force clients to 
reciprocate.  There is no logical or moral reason for Indigenous people to feel obliged 
for government assistance which ineffectively responds to their experience of social 
marginalization.  Yet the logic of SRAs implies that Indigenous people should be more 
responsible for the outcomes of social intervention.  Were social intervention agendas 
set by clients, their commitment could be expected.  This seems the sticking point of 
MO policy. 
 
What then is the likelihood that MO policy will facilitate self-determination and client 
definition of social policy objectives?  Historical welfare policy expected Indigenous 
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commitment to various assimilation strategies.  There is currently no committed official 
process ensuring that policy outcomes satisfy clients, are individually just or 
economically-rational.  Remote Indigenous social intervention is based on technical 
definitions of need (see Thompson 2004) and presumably SRAs (in time).  Pearson 
(2004:5,9,11) argues that Indigenous leadership must be consistent but restrictive 
about factors which harm Indigenous communities.  Coercive welfare policy is 
advocated because it seems irrational to tolerate the substance-abuse and child-
neglect which seem characteristic of Indigenous living conditions (Pearson 2000b:15).  
In accord with ‘charitable’ welfare, irresponsible liberty is not perceived as acceptable 
for welfare clients (see Pearson 2000:87; Rowse 2002:267,271; Pearson 2004:11) 
even though such selfish rationality is normal to mainstream life.  In this conservative 
context, policy objectives are more likely to be influenced by Government or Indigenous 
leaders’ paternal concerns than by clients’ needs. 
 
In a modern-liberal economy it is possible that liberal economic strategy will benefit 
clients more than a failed model of conservative paternalism (see Hughes 1995).  
Modern liberalism assumes a rationality within which individuals are only obliged to pay 
the cost of those factors which they perceive will most increase their own satisfaction.  
Rational individuals do not make informed economic choices which are unsatisfying.  
But Indigenous leaders cannot be expected to make choices which personally satisfy 
and oblige other people.   
 
Economic decision-making is valuable because it allows consumers logically to choose 
those goods which are most satisfying as against their cost.  Contemporary ‘mutual 
obligation’ policy, like historical housing policy, will fail if it compels clients to expend 
scarce resources on agendas of marginal relevance which are prescribed by policy-
makers or community leaders.     
 
In a society which is dominated by rational thinking, MO policies concerned with 
problems like Indigenous alcohol consumption must be cognizant of client preferences 
and the social conditions which are causing alcohol to be a social priority.  Pearson 
considers that five factors cause alcohol to be a social priority: first, the ‘substance has 
to be available’, second, the consumers must have the ‘money to acquire the 
substance’, third, they must have enough ‘spare time to use the substance’, fourth, 
they must have the inappropriate ‘example of others in the immediate environment’ and 
fifth, there must be ‘a permissive social ideology in some circles of the community’ 
(2004:3).  Thus Pearson’s analysis constructs the problem it as a traditional, 
conservative morality issue, characterized by an epidemic of dissolute idleness and 
abusive values in Indigenous communities.  After constructing a problem in these 19th 
century ‘charitable’ terms (see Kennedy) there can only be a 19th century charitable 
response.  Pearson’s and the Government’s ‘Modern Conservative’ social policy 
strategy (Howard 1999) concur about more ‘restrictive’ interventions.  Conservatively, if 
libertarian permissiveness and passive welfare have permitted sick values to become 
normal in Indigenous communities, then Indigenous leadership must take control and 
address these morally deficient circumstances by setting an example and restricting 
those five factors which are causing the problem.  This is seen as a necessarily 
coercive, but compassionate response. 
 
Indigenous need is constructed alternately from Reser’s (1979) perspective.  Perhaps 
Indigenous satisfaction is affected so profoundly by imposed powerlessness that 
drinkers self-medicate to deal with unsatisfied relationship, self-esteem and self-
actualization needs.  Obviously the conservative construction of the problem is only 
one possibility and an approach can be considered which is cognizant of economic-
needs.  Just as many Indigenous people still avoid value-based assimilation, many 
historically refused to pay rent and many will not commit to the priorities of their 
leadership.  Just as the rental policy failed to impose the desired housing value system 
on clients, so will new mutual-obligation policies fail if they do not allow clients to set 
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their own agendas, and choose appropriate goods/services for their perceived needs 
and problems.  Just as the economic choice not to pay rent and not to integrate was 
historical evidence that Indigenous people seek to succeed in their own economic 
reality, it should be assumed that contemporary clients will feel obliged to participate 
only in processes which they recognise as useful for their needs or circumstances.  
From this perspective, the client experience of need determines commitment, and any 
officially determined objectives are mere impositions which cannot facilitate ‘mutual 
obligation’. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The above discussion cites economic logic in order to demonstrate how: 
1) conservative policy-makers approach intractable policy problems by attacking 
human failings which they perceive as causative;  
2) clients focus their efforts in solving their perceived problematic unmet needs;   
3) those who feel powerless to control their social conditions may perceive alcohol 
consumption to alleviate unsatisfied needs; and  
4) conservative Indigenous policy failed because it forced clients to focus on 
change which was not perceived as needed or satisfying. 
 
The discussion also demonstrates how contemporary policy-logic is dangerously close 
to arguing that failing policy be transformed by applying historically-discredited, forced 
personal change strategy.  Historical analysis has shown a tendency to implement 
coercive policy approaches where administrators perceive that their intentions are 
compassionate and therefore that clients should be obliged. 
 
The mutual obligations and reciprocal agreements of contemporary policy logic exist at 
many levels in society.  Such reciprocal agreements are based on parties voluntarily 
forgoing certain rights or benefits so that they can achieve longer term outcomes for 
the benefit of both parties.  Such an arrangement can be achieved in Indigenous policy 
when the stakeholders achieving the benefits and meeting the obligations agree to the 
arrangements.  There may be benefits possible through MO policy for Indigenous 
clients if they participate in an informed manner in setting outcome priorities, choosing 
reciprocal obligations and committing to these achievements according to their own 
perceived needs and resource limits.  This accords with modern-liberal notions of 
choice. 
 
It must be recognized that many Indigenous clients experience a low level of welfare 
and, as such, have a low capacity for meeting imposed obligations.  Their satisfaction 
is thereby dependent on increased power to choose actions and achieve their culturally 
determined priorities.  Such increased power could well involve Indigenous leadership 
and organizations, if client choice was facilitated by organizational and leadership 
structures and if these elements increased their power to negotiate for their own 
priorities.  Successful implementation of the mutual obligation agenda requires further 
research into the priorities of Indigenous clients and the potential for organizations and 
leadership to negotiate for them. 
 
The case study demonstrates that there is a difficult challenge in the radical value-
based change associated with imposing reciprocal responsibilities.  If contemporary 
MO policy is to meet this challenge, the model should be considered against the 
economics of previous policy failure.  If, as stated, MO policy seeks increased client 
commitment to previously unsuccessful policy, then it expects radical value-based 
change, and needs to consider the satisfaction which policy outcomes offer.  If it is 
perceived to impose excessively for its benefits, it will fail.   If, unlike the historical 
agenda, the new policy is to decrease client  dependence, its ultimate test will be in the 
level of client determination in problem and priority setting. 
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